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Abstract
It is often assumed that animals and people adjust their behavior to maximize reward acquisition. In visually cued
reinforcement schedules, monkeys make errors in trials that are not immediately rewarded, despite having to repeat error
trials. Here we show that error rates are typically smaller in trials equally distant from reward but belonging to longer
schedules (referred to as ‘‘schedule length effect’’). This violates the principles of reward maximization and invariance and
cannot be predicted by the standard methods of Reinforcement Learning, such as the method of temporal differences. We
develop a heuristic model that accounts for all of the properties of the behavior in the reinforcement schedule task but
whose predictions are not different from those of the standard temporal difference model in choice tasks. In the
modification of temporal difference learning introduced here, the effect of schedule length emerges spontaneously from
the sensitivity to the immediately preceding trial. We also introduce a policy for general Markov Decision Processes, where
the decision made at each node is conditioned on the motivation to perform an instrumental action, and show that the
application of our model to the reinforcement schedule task and the choice task are special cases of this general theoretical
framework. Within this framework, Reinforcement Learning can approach contextual learning with the mixture of empirical
findings and principled assumptions that seem to coexist in the best descriptions of animal behavior. As examples, we
discuss two phenomena observed in humans that often derive from the violation of the principle of invariance: ‘‘framing,’’
wherein equivalent options are treated differently depending on the context in which they are presented, and the ‘‘sunk
cost’’ effect, the greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made.
The schedule length effect might be a manifestation of these phenomena in monkeys.
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Introduction
In studying reward-seeking behavior it is often assumed that
animals attempt to maximize long term returns. This postulate
often forms the basis of normative models of decision making [1],
choice behavior [2–4], and motivation [5], and plays a prominent
role in the field of Reinforcement Learning (RL; see, e.g., [6]). RL
is a set of methods for learning to predict rewarding outcomes
from their association with environmental cues, and to exploit
these predictions to generate effective behavioral policies. These
are policies that comply with principles of reward maximization
[7,8] and invariance [9,10]. Applied to reward-seeking behavior,
the principle of reward maximization states that subjects should
maximize the reward/cost ratio, and the invariance principle that
subjects should be equally motivated when facing situations with
identical reward/cost ratios.
The idea of maximizing reward over time or effort is general
and has provided an effective basis for describing decision-making
where the choice between available options is basically a matter of
preference. RL methods such as the method of temporal
differences (TD) constitute an efficient way of solving decision
problems in tasks where a subject must choose between a larger vs.
a smaller reward, or between a more probable vs. a less probable
reward, and predict courses of actions comparable to the actual
behavior observed in animals performing the same tasks [11–13].
RL methods have proven less successful, however, in situations
where motivation, defined as the incentive to be engaged in a task
at all, plays a strong role [14–16]. A case in point is the behavior of
monkeys performing visually-cued reinforcement schedules [17],
wherein a series of identical actions is required to obtain reward,
and a visual cue indicates how many trials remain to be completed
before a reward is delivered (‘‘reward schedule task,’’ see Figure 1).
In this task, the error rate of the monkeys is proportional to the
number of unrewarded trials remaining before reward, indicating
that the value of the trial is modified by knowing the number of
remaining trials. This violates the principle of reward-maximiza-
tion: monkeys make errors in unrewarded trials that will have to be
repeated, thus preventing optimal reward-harvesting behavior.
Here we show that in trials equally far from reward, monkeys
make fewer errors in longer schedules, when more trials have
already been performed (‘‘schedule length effect’’). Thus, the value
of the current trial is also modified by the number of trials already
completed. This behavior violates the principle of invariance:
monkeys perform differently in trials equally far from reward,
depending on the number of trials already completed in the
current schedule. Taken together, these results suggest that the
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principles of invariance and reward-optimization, as commonly
assumed when applying RL methods to understanding reward-
seeking behavior.
We present a RL rule which predicts the monkeys’ behavior in
the reward schedule task. Such a rule is a heuristic generalization
of TD learning. When applied to the reward schedule task, it
predicts all aspects of monkeys’ behavior, including the sensitivity
to the contextual effect due to schedule length leading to the
violation of the invariance principle. When applied to a task
involving choice preference, the new method predicts the same
behavior as does the standard TD model. Thus, the behaviors in
the reward schedule and in choice tasks can be the consequence of
the same learning rule.
Building on the special cases of the reward schedule and choice
tasks, we then provide a general theory for Markov Decision
Processes, wherein the transition to the next state is governed in a
manner similar to a choice task, but is conditioned on whether the
agent is sufficiently motivated to act at all, like in the reward
schedule task. Finally, we link the schedule length effect to
instances of ‘‘framing’’ [18,19] and ‘‘sunk cost’’ effects [20,21],




In this work we collate the behavior of 24 monkeys tested in the
reward schedule task [17], and analyze the entire set of data as a
group (see Material and Methods). In this task, a series of trials had
to be completed successfully to obtain reward at the end of the
series. This series is defined to be a schedule, which is then
characterized by its length measured in number of trials (Materials
and Methods and Figure 1). The monkey starts each trial by
holding a bar which causes a visual cue to appear on a computer
screen, followed by the appearance of a red dot in the middle of
the screen. The monkey must wait for the red dot to turn green
(‘‘GO’’ signal), at which point it must release the bar within a 200–
1000 ms window. If the bar is released correctly, the monkey
proceeds to the next trial of the schedule. Each trial must be
repeated until performed correctly.
In the presence of visual cues informing the monkey of the
progress through the schedule (Valid Cue condition), the
percentage of errors in all monkeys was directly related to the
number of trials remaining to be completed in the schedule, i.e.,
the largest number of errors occurred in the trials that are furthest
from the reward (x
2 test, p,0.05; Figure 2A and 2B, circles; each
trial is labeled by the fraction t/s, where t stands for current trial
and s stands for current schedule length). The performance in
terminal trials was indistinguishable across schedules for each
monkey, was above 94% correct in 14 out of 24 monkeys, and
above 90% in 19 out of 24 monkeys.
In the Random Cue condition the visual cues were selected at
random and bore no relationship to schedule state. In such a
condition, error rates were indistinguishable across all schedule
states (or idiosyncratic; ‘‘x’’ in Figure 2A and 2B; x
2 test, p.0.05 in
10 out of 15 monkeys tested in the Random Cue condition), and
close to the error rates in terminal trials in the Valid Cue
condition. Thus, performance in unrewarded trials in the Valid
Cue condition was well below the ability of the monkeys. Since the
individual trials of each schedule have the same perceptual and
motor demands, we interpret the different error rates as being
related to the different levels of motivation. This interpretation is
also supported by the observation that, in most monkeys, the
Figure 1. Behavioral paradigm used in the reward schedule
task. (A) Color discrimination task. Each trial begins with the monkey
touching a bar. A visual cue (horizontal black bar) appears immediately.
Four hundred milliseconds later a red dot (WAIT signal) appears in the
center of the cue. After a random interval of 500–1500 ms the dot turns
green (GO signal). The monkey is required to release the touch-bar
between 200 and 800 ms after the green dot appeared, in which case
the dot turns blue (OK signal), and a drop of water is delivered 250 to
350 ms later. If the monkey fails to release the bar within the 200–
800 ms interval after the GO signal, an error is registered, and no water
is delivered. An anticipated bar release (,200 ms) is also counted as an
error. (Red, green and blue dots are enlarged for the purpose of
illustration). (B) 2-trial schedule. Each trial is a color discrimination task
as in panel A, with cues of different brightness for different trials (see
Materials and Methods for details). In the 2-trial schedule, completion of
the first trial is not rewarded and is followed by the second trial after an
inter-trial interval (ITI) of 1–2 seconds. An error at any point during a
trial causes the trial to be aborted and then started again after the ITI
interval. The same applies to schedules of any length. Schedules of
different length are randomly interleaved. Note that after an error, the




Theories of rational behavior are built on a number of
principles, including the assumption that subjects adjust
their behavior to maximize their long-term returns and
that they should work equally hard to obtain a reward in
situations where the effort to obtain reward is the same
(called the invariance principle). Humans, however, are
sensitive to the manner in which equivalent choices are
presented, or ‘‘framed,’’ and often have a greater tendency
to continue an endeavor once an investment in money,
effort, or time has been made, a phenomenon known as
‘‘sunk cost’’ effect. In a similar manner, when monkeys
must perform different numbers of trials to obtain a
reward, they work harder as the number of trials already
performed increases, even though both the work remain-
ing and the forthcoming reward are the same in all
situations. Methods from the theory of Reinforcement
Learning, which usually provide learning strategies aimed
at maximizing returns, cannot model this violation of
invariance. Here we generalize a prominent method of
Reinforcement Learning so as to explain the violation of
invariance, without losing the ability to model behaviors
explained by standard Reinforcement Learning models.
This generalization extends our understanding of how
animals and humans learn and behave.
Violation of Invariance in Reinforcement Schedules
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approached [17,22–25].
In the penultimate trials of each schedule (i.e., 1/2, 2/3, and 3/
4 when available) 20 of 24 monkeys made progressively fewer
errors as the schedule became longer (sign test, p,0.005). The
error rate in state 1/2 was significantly larger than in state 2/3 in
12 out of 20 monkeys (Marascuilo procedure, p,0.05, see
Materials and Methods and Figure 2C and 2D). In two of three
monkeys tested with 4 schedules, the error rate in state 2/3 was
also significantly larger than in state 3/4. The third monkey tested
with 4 schedules showed small error rates, and multiple
comparisons between penultimate trials were not significant
(monkeys often will not perform the task with 4 schedules
[17]).
In many of these studies the cues were distinguished by their
brightness, where their brightness had been set according to the
number of trials remaining in the schedule (Material and
Methods), raising the possibility that performance was related to
judging the brightness. However, this seems unlikely because the
behavioral sensitivity was also seen when unique stimuli, e.g.,
Walsh patterns, were used as cues (e.g., Figure 2 of [26]), where no
feature of the visual stimulus is a graded function of reward
proximity or progress through the schedule. In conclusion, in a
population of monkeys there was a significant tendency for
motivation to increase with the number of trials already
performed, at parity of proximity to reward. We refer this
phenomenon to as the ‘‘schedule length effect.’’
Model
In the reward schedule task, all trials have the same cost because
they all require the same action in response to the same trigger (the
appearance of the green dot); trials differ only in their proximity to
reward, which in turn does not depend on how many trials have
already been performed. A standard reinforcement learning
method can only learn to predict the proximity to reward
correctly, and thus, unlike the behavior shown by the monkeys, is
insensitive to the context introduced by the schedule length. We
address this issue in detail in the remainder of this manuscript.
The basic model. We assume that performance, here
measured as the percentage of correct trials in each schedule
state, reflects the monkey’s motivation, which in turn reflects the
value of that schedule state. Both rewarded and unrewarded trials
acquire value: if unrewarded trials had no value, the monkeys
would not perform them because there would be no motivation to
do so. Thus, value acquisition must be based on a mechanism
capable of learning to predict delayed rewards, like the method of
temporal differences [27]. The values of the trials reflect any
attribute that will affect motivation such as temporal discounting
or intrinsic reward value, and thus will be referred to as
motivational values. Performance accuracy will be guided
completely by the motivational values, whereas other factors
such as sensory or motor thresholds will be ignored, given that all
monkeys found the color-discrimination task required in each trial
(Figure 1A) easy to learn and perform (see Materials and
Methods).
Figure 2. Monkeys’ behavior in the reward schedule task. (A–B) Error rates as a function of schedule state for two monkeys, for both valid
(circles) and random cues (‘‘x’’). Each schedule state is labeled by the fraction t/s, where t stands for current trial and s stands for current schedule
length. Maximal schedule length was 3 for monkey A and 4 for monkey B. In both monkeys, error rates with valid cues are significantly different (x
2
test, p,10
210). In monkey A, the error rate in states 1/2 is larger than in state 2/3 (Marasquilo test for multiple comparisons, p,0.005); in monkey B,
the error rate in state 2/3 is larger than in state 3/4, and error rate in state 1/2 is larger than in state 2/3 (Marasquilo test, p,0.05). Original data from
refs. [25] (A) and [44] (B). (C) scatter plot of the difference in error rates between states 1/2 and 2/3 (E(1/2)2E(2/3)) vs. the maximal error rate for all 24
monkeys. Filled circles mark positive differences E(1/2)2E(2/3) which are significant (Marasquilo test for multiple comparisons, p,0.05). (D) error rates
(dots) for the 12 monkeys corresponding to the closed circles in panel C. Thick grey lines: medians.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000131.g002
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performance and motivational values, and provides a recipe for
learning the values. In general terms, the model assumes that the
agent, on any given state S, performs the required action correctly
with a probability proportional to the value of that state, V(S),
through a softmax ‘‘performance function’’:
PmS j ðÞ ~
ebVS ðÞ
1zebVS ðÞ ð1Þ
The parameter b controls the steepness of the performance
function in the region around V(S)=0. Thus, P(m|S) is the
probability of being motivated enough to perform the action
required to leave state S. Its complement, P(m ¯|S), is the probability
that the agent is not motivated enough to perform correctly, i.e.,
the model correlate of the error rate in state S:
P   m mS j ðÞ ~1{PmS j ðÞ ~
1
1zebVS ðÞ ð2Þ
In the particular case of the reward schedule, Equation 1
specifies completely the ‘‘policy’’ followed by the agent. We shall
clarify in a later section that Equation 1 is a special case of the
policy we propose for general Markov Decision Processes. V(S)i s
updated trial-by-trial according to
Vtz1 St ðÞ ~Vt St ðÞ zadt ð3Þ
where t is the trial number, Vt+1(St) is the value of current state St at
trial t+1, a is a learning rate (here a constant), and d is the temporal
difference term of TD learning:
dt~rtzcVt Stz1 ðÞ {Vt St ðÞ ð 4Þ
Vt(St+1) is the current value of the state expected to follow the action
taken.rt istherewarddelivered asa consequenceofthat action(r=0
in all incorrect trials and in correct, unrewarded trials, and r=1in
correct, rewarded trials). Parameter c, with 0#c,1, is a temporal
discount factor that establishes the importance of the next state’s
value for updating the value of the current state (Figure 3A). When
c=0, the value of the current state is only related to the immediate
reward contingency; when c.0, all future contingencies affect the
value of the current state, weighted by proximity, allowing learning
to predict delayed contingencies, see, e.g., [6]. Learning is
accomplished by minimizing the difference dt. When an error is
made, a negative d follows, decreasing the value of the current state,
thereby increasing the probability of making an error upon the next
occurrence of that state. By performing correctly (by chance or
otherwise), the algorithm reinforces the values of the schedule states,
increasing the probability of correct performance in the future. At
equilibrium, the average ds vanish in each schedule state, and the
state-values fluctuate around their equilibrium values. So far the
main difference from the more common implementations of TD
learning is that these latter implementations use d also to improve
the action selection process directly, whereas here the parameters of
the performance function (Equation 1) are held constant. When the
TD signal d is also used to improve the action selection process, this
typically leads to the development of an optimal policy, i.e., a policy
which maximizes the long-term acquisitionof reward [6]. Following
Sutton [27], we interpret TD learning as a general means of
learning to predict delayed contingencies, and not necessarily for
learning an optimal policy.
Figure 3. Models. (A) Diagrammatic representation of the basic model for 3- and 2-trial schedules. (B) General pattern of error rates predicted by
the basic model. For trials with the same reward proximity (pre-reward number, preRN, plotted in the same color) the model predicts equal error
rates. (C) Diagrammatic representation of the context-sensitive model for the 3-trial schedule. (D) General pattern of error rates predicted by the
context-sensitive model. For trials with the same reward proximity (in same color) the model predicts smaller error rates in longer schedules.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000131.g003
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where t stands for current trial and s stands for current schedule
length, so that Equation 4 reads
d~rtzcVt ttz1,st ðÞ {Vt tt,st ðÞ ð 5Þ
If an error is made, t+1 is replaced by t because the trial is
repeated. In a correct terminal trial (t=s and rt.0), the next state
St+1 is unknown, and its value is set to zero (the common choice in
RL, see, e.g., [6]). An alternative option would be to endow the
model with some ‘‘post-reward expectation’’ and assign some
positive value to the next state (for example, the mean value of the
first trials). This approach scales all values by a constant factor,
producing the same qualitative behavior (see Materials and
Methods for details).
In the validly-cued reward schedule, learning continues until the
average d vanishes in all states. In terminal trials, V=r, where r is
the amount of reward received in each rewarded trial. For non-
terminal trials (t,s), the equilibrium condition is V(t,s)=cV(t+1,s),
i.e., trials more proximal to reward are more valuable, and by
iteration
V t,s ðÞ ~c s{t ðÞ r ð6Þ
Here, V depends only on the difference between s and t, i.e., the
proximity to reward. Therefore, it can be written as
V preRN~is j ðÞ ~cir ð7Þ
where preRN=s2t is the pre-reward number (defined to be zero in
terminal trials), and V(i|s) is the value of the state having preRN=i,
conditioned on schedule length being s (which, as Equation 7
shows, does not depend on s). Trials with larger preRN have smaller
values (since c,1). The actual values will converge to the
theoretical values given above only in the absence of errors, i.e.,
if the policy is to execute every trial correctly independently of its
value. If the policy is given by Equation 1, then the correct values
must be found by solving self-consistent equations (given in the
Materials and Methods, Equation 13). However, the results are
qualitatively the same and for simplicity we shall use the values of
Equation 7 in the following.
As Equation 7 shows, trials equally distant from reward will
acquire the same value and thus produce the same error rate
under any policy (Figure 3B). Thus, the basic model is not sensitive
to the contextual effect of schedule length observed in the data,
i.e., the difference in performance between penultimate trials
belonging to schedules of different length. This phenomenon can
be seen as a broken symmetry between trials with the same
proximity to reward, which are equivalent in the basic model. In
the next section we propose a different TD learning rule which is
sensitive to the context produced by schedule length.
Context-sensitive model: the effect of schedule
length. In the schedule length effect, the value of each trial is
larger than predicted by proximity to reward alone. A simple
speculation on how this might arise is that the value of each trial is
enhanced by having completed any previous trial in the current
schedule. This idea can be implemented by modifying the
temporal difference rule as follows:
d~rtzcVt ttz1,st ðÞ zsVt tt{1,st ðÞ {Vt tt,st ðÞ ð 8Þ
In this rule, the value of the immediately preceding trial is also
taken into account. The parameter s quantifies the fraction of
value carried forward to the next trial, with 0,s,1. This is just
the basic model when s=0. In first trials we set s=0, i.e., the
value of rewarded trials is not carried forward. This seems a
natural choice because the terminal states of each schedule are not
part of the next sequence required to obtain reward. However, no
qualitatively different behavior would result from keeping s.0i n
first trials also (see Materials and Methods). All other details are as
in the basic model, including Equation 3 which remains
unchanged. In this rule, a trial acquires value due to both the
next trial and the previous one (Figure 3C). When learning has
occurred (i.e., d fluctuating around zero), the new learning rule
gives V(t,s)=r+cV(t+1,s)+sV(t21,s) (compare with the value in the
basic model, r+cV(t+1,s)). This gives V(t,s) a dependence on
schedule length s, unlike Equation 7. In the absence of errors, the




V33~r 1{cs ðÞ 1{2cs ðÞ
{1, V23~c 1{cs ðÞ
{1V33, V13~cV23:
ð9Þ
If errors are made according to Equation 2, a more involved set of
self-consistent equations defines the values implicitly (see Materials
and Methods), but this does not affect the qualitative pattern of
behavior described next. The relation V1s=cV2s, that in the basic
model holds for the values of all pairs of successive schedule states,
applies here only to first trials, whereas the value of the
intermediate trial V23 is augmented by a factor (12cs)
21.1 due
to the temporal accumulation of values of past trials. This gives
V23.V12, i.e., the value of state 2/3 is greater than that of state 1/
2, as observed in the experiments. In general, the error rates will
be different in trials with the same preRN but belonging to different
schedules (Figure 3D). We refer to this model as ‘‘context-
sensitive’’ because the motivational context due to the schedule
length is an emergent property of, and not an input to, the model
itself (e.g., through a redefinition of the schedule states). For s=0,
Equation 6 of the basic model reappears.
Predictions of the models in the Random Cue
condition. The model predicts equal values for random cues
that bear no relationship to schedule state. This results in uniform
error rates, with a small spread around the mean due to the
stochasticity in the cue selection and the learning processes. Any
TD-based model would make the same prediction, which is a
consequence of a symmetry contained in the design of the task, i.e.,
all cues are associated with reward with the same frequency. In the
absence of errors, the mean value of random cues is
V~
Nzr
1{ czs ðÞ 1{Nz ðÞ
ð10Þ
where 0,N+,1 is the fraction of rewarded trials, and is equal to
the number of schedules divided by the number of schedule states
(Materials and Methods). Uniform performance is indeed
observed in the data (black crosses in Figure 2A and 2B). Thus,
the context-sensitive model can explain all the qualitative
properties of the behavior in the reward schedule task.
The same properties can also be captured quantitatively, as
shown by the best fits of the context-sensitive model to the data
(Figure 4A and 4B). The parameters of the model were tuned to
minimize the difference between the model fits and the
experimental error rates (see Materials and Methods), and the
same parameters values were used for valid and random cues. The
best-fit values of c and s ranged from 0.2 to 0.8 and from 0.1 to
Violation of Invariance in Reinforcement Schedules
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(r=20.82, r
2=0.67, p,10
26). The negative correlation between
s and c is to be expected since s is a measure of the strength of the
schedule length effect, which is stronger when the maximal error
rate is larger (Figure 2C), and the latter is in turn inversely related
to the discount rate c. We emphasize that although we fit the
model to individual experimental cases, the qualitative behavior
predicted by the model is independent of the actual choice of
parameters (provided that the value of s is within the allowed
range, see Materials and Methods).
Predictions of the context-sensitive model in the reward
schedule task. Both the basic and context-sensitive models
predict that valid and random cues have roughly the same average
value, as shown in Figure 4C, which depicts the error rate as a
function of the values of schedule states (Equation 2). The larger
dots represent the mean values of valid (black) and random (grey)
cues respectively, which are generally close to each other. In the
inset of Figure 4C this is shown for 2 to 10 schedules. The mean
values decrease with the number of schedules, since the average
fraction of rewarded trials also decreases with the number of
schedules. The prediction that valid and random cues have
approximately the same average value does not have a direct
experimental correlate, since one only has access to the error rates.
Intuitively, however, the correlation between the mean values of
valid and random cues should be reflected in the correlation
between the median error rates in the two paradigms. This
correlation was presentin the data (Figure4D,r
2=0.69, p,0.0005).
Figure 4C suggests that the overall level of motivation (as
measured by the average values) is approximately the same with
either valid or random cues. The non-linearity of the performance
function explains why the overall performance is better in the
Random Cue condition than in the Valid Cue condition. The
values of valid cues (black dots in Figure 4C) spread around their
mean (larger black dot), producing distributed error rates which
depend on schedule state, whereas random cues’ values have a
limited spread (not shown) around their mean (grey dot) due only
to random fluctuations, producing indistinguishable error rates. As
shown in Figure 4C, the complement of the performance function
(Equation 2) tends to flatten towards larger values more than for
smaller ones. As a consequence, performance with random cues is
much closer to the performance in validly cued rewarded, rather
than unrewarded, trials (as, e.g., in Figure 2A and 2B).
Predictions of the context-sensitive model in choice
tasks. To be a valid generalization of TD learning, the
context-sensitive model must predict the same qualitative
behavior is situations where animal behavior is well described by
the standard model. We show here that this is generally true in
situations involving behavioral choices. In particular, this means
that the context-sensitive model does not predict a suboptimal
behavior in tasks where this is not observed.
A simple choice task entails the offer of two alternative options,
say A and B, to an agent which has the freedom to choose between
the two and will get rewarded accordingly. In the deterministic
version of this task, one option is always rewarded, the other is
Figure 4. Predictions of the context-sensitive model in the reward schedule task. (A–B) Theoretical error rates predicted by the context-
sensitive model (black) for both valid (circles) and random (‘‘x’’) cues. The model parameters were tuned to match the experimental error rates of
Figure 2A and 2B respectively using least-square minimization as described in Materials and Methods. The experimental data from Figure 2 are
reproduced in grey for comparison. Parameters for Monkey A (B): b=3.6 (3.2), s=0.3 (0.8), c=0.4 (0.3). (C) Error rate (Equation 2) as a function of
schedule state values (full curve) for the model of panel B. Black dots are the actual values of valid cues in the standard model (i.e., with s=0; see
Equation 6); larger dots are the mean values of valid (black) and random (grey) cues. The inset shows the predicted mean values of valid (black) and
random (grey) cues for paradigms with 2 to 10 schedules (basic model). Larger dots correspond to the case of main figure (4 schedules). (D) Linear
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rewarded more often than the other, and neither of them is
rewarded with certainty; or both options are rewarded with equal
probability but in different amounts; and so on (Figure 5A). A
standard reinforcement model would predict a preference (as
measured by choice ratio) for the more rewarded option in all
cases, and will learn to choose always the rewarded option in the
deterministic choice task. The context-sensitive model predicts
exactly the same behavior (Figure 5B). This is most easily
explained in the fully deterministic case where option A gives
always a reward r whereas option B gives no reward (i.e.,
Prew(A)=1 in Figure 5B). In this case, for s=0 the values of the two
options approximate the amount of reward obtained, i.e., VA=r
and VB=0. When 0,s,1, the value of each option is increased
on average by the same amount, i.e., V?Vz s
1{sPsel A ðÞ r, where
Psel(A) is the observed frequency of selecting A. Under the standard
assumption that the action with larger value is selected more often,
such preference will not be reversed in the context-sensitive model.
For example, under a softmax model for Psel(A), e.g.,
Psel A ðÞ ~ebVA 
ebVAzebVB   
~1
 
1ze{b VA{VB ðÞ   
, the probabil-
ity of selecting A depends only on the difference VA2VB, which is
left unchanged. Similar results are found for the probabilistic
version of the task, where the best option is rewarded with
probability Prew(A).0.5 and the other with probability 12Prew(A)
(Figure 5B). The two models give the same results also under a
‘‘greedy’’ policy, which by definition selects always the action with
larger value (this can be obtained from the softmax function by
letting bR‘). These conclusions hold also for variations of this
two-choice task where the probability that one choice is the better
option increases with the number of consecutive selections of the
alternative choice, typically resulting in matching behavior (see,
e.g., [28]; not shown).
The argument can be generalized to an n-choice task
(Figure 5C), where each choice gives a reward drawn from a
given distribution (sometimes called the n-armed bandit task in the
RL literature, see, e.g., [6]). Also in this case, all values are
increased by the same amount c in the context-sensitive model,




is invariant under the scaling VjRVj+c. As a consequence, the
frequency of each choice does not depend on the value of s
(Figure 5D).
The reason for which a positive s will not make a difference in a
choice task is that at each decision node the same value (sVN in
Figure 5A and 5C) will be carried over to whatever the outcome of
the choice. For s.0 to have an effect on the choice, the choice
must be followed by a sequence of states or actions, with different
Figure 5. Predictions of the context-sensitive model in choice tasks. (A) Two-choice task. At decision node N (of value VN) the agent can
either choose action A (which gives a larger or more probable reward) or action B (smaller or less probable reward). The same value sVN is carried
over to whatever outcome of the choice (curved arrows). (B) Mean frequency of choosing action A in the two-choice task of panel 5A (Psel(A)) vs. the
probability that action A is rewarded (Prew(A)) for different values of s (see the text). For each value of Prew(A), four values of s were used (0. 0.1, 0.2,
and 0.3). Shown are means (dots) and standard deviations (error bars) over 20 simulations with b=3 and r=1 together with the theoretical prediction
Psel A ðÞ ~ 1ze{br 2Prew A ðÞ {1 ðÞ    {1
(dashed line). For s=0, the model is the standard TD model. Choice preference does not depend on the value of s.
(C) 4-armed bandit task. At decision node N the agent can choose between 4 possible actions, each rewarding the agent according to a predefined
probability distribution. The same value sVN is carried over to whatever outcome of the choice. (D) Mean frequency of choosing each of the four
alternative actions of the 4-armed bandit task of panel 5C for different values of s (same values as in panel 5B). Each choice was rewarded according
to a Gaussian distribution truncated at negative values, with mean m=0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 and standard deviation 0.25. Shown are means (dots) and
standard deviations (error bars) over 20 simulations with b=3, together with the theoretical prediction Psel i ðÞ ~ebmi
 P
jebmj (dashed line). Choice
frequencies do not depend on the value of s.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000131.g005
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illustrate this point, consider a combination of a choice task and a
reward schedule task which we shall name ‘‘two-choice schedule
task’’ (Figure 6A). Assume that an agent can choose whether to
receive a reward R now and a smaller reward r later on ({R,r},
schedule A), or the smaller reward now and the larger one later on
({r,R}, schedule B). This task is more complex than the simple
choice task, because here the initial action or choice affects the
return obtainable from subsequent ones. A standard TD model
predicts a preference for schedule A, since this model discounts
later rewards, penalizing reward R in schedule B more than in
schedule A. Numerically, Vsch.A2Vsch.B=(12c)(R2r).0, and the
‘‘immediate-reward’’ schedule A is chosen more often than the
‘‘delayed-reward’’ schedule B. This is modified into
Vs;sch.A2Vs;sch.B=(12cs)
21(12c)(R2r).Vsch.A2Vsch.B in the con-
text-dependent model. The difference between the values of the
two schedules not only keeps its sign, but is increased in
magnitude. This is because in the immediate-reward schedule A,
a larger value is carried over to the next trial compared to the
delayed-reward schedule. Thus, the context-sensitive model
amplifies the existing preference for the immediate-reward
schedule (Figure 6B). However, no new qualitative behavior
emerges.
These conclusions hold for any choice schedule with two
schedule states (i.e., with any choice of rewards and parameters
values). In this more general case, parameters can be chosen so
that a preference for either schedule could emerge; however, a
positive value of s can only amplify the existing preference (not
shown).
A positive s can alter an existing preference if the schedules
comprise more than two trials. Consider for example the case where
upon selection of schedule A the agent receives reward R at the first
stepandthen asmallerrewardratthe nexttwo steps,i.e.,aschedule
of type {R,r,r}; whereas schedule B gives the smaller reward first,
followed by the larger reward in the next two steps: {r,R,R}
(Figure 6C). Since in this case Vsch.A2Vsch.B=(12c2c
2)(R2r), the






    
2&0:618. Depending on the value of the
discount factor c, both schedules may be preferred in this task
under standard TD learning. For c just above its critical value c ˆ,a
positive value of s can only increase the agent’s preference for the
delayed-reward schedule B; but for c just below its critical value c ˆ,a
Figure 6. Predictions of the context-sensitive model in choice-schedule tasks. (A) Description of the choice-schedule task with 2-trial
schedules. At decision node N (of value VN) the agent can either choose the immediate-reward schedule A (which gives a larger reward, R, sooner and
a smaller reward, r, later) or the delayed-reward schedule B (smaller reward sooner and larger reward later). The same value sVN is carried over to
whatever outcome of the choice, but following trials in each schedule modify the value of A or B differently (curved grey arrows, shown for schedule
A only. See the text for details). (B) Mean frequency of choosing the immediate-reward schedule (schedule A) in the task of panel 6A predicted by the
model as a function of s. Shown are means (dots) and standard deviations (error bars) over 20 simulations with b=3, c=0.55, R=1 and r=0.5.
Dashed line: theoretical prediction according to the equation Psel sch:A ðÞ ~ 1ze{b Vsch:A{Vsch:B ðÞ    {1
with Vsch.A2Vsch.B=(12cs)
21(12c)(R2r). A
positive value of s enhances the existing preference for the immediate-reward schedule. (C) Choice-schedule task between two 3-trial schedules, a
generalization of the task in panel 6A. (D) mean frequency of choosing the immediate-reward schedule (schedule A) in the task of panel 6C predicted
by the model as a function of s. Shown are means (dots) and standard deviations (error bars) over 20 simulations with the same parameters as in 6B.




Dotted line: indifference point Psel(sch.A)=0.5, i.e., the situation where the agent has no preference for either schedule. For s larger than <0.268, choice
preference is reversed and the delayed-reward schedule is chosen more often.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000131.g006
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rewardscheduleAandtowardsthedelayed-rewardscheduleB.Th is
isshown inFigure6D,wherec=0.55,R=1,andr=0.5.With these
parameters, a reversal in preference occurs at s<0.268. It can be
shown that for any choice schedule task with three states, a
preference for the delayed-reward schedule will always be amplified
by a positive s, whereas a preference for the immediate-reward
schedule could be reversed if some conditions are met. However,
either schedule could be favored in the standard model also,
depending on the value of the discount factor c. In a choice task
between two n-trial schedules, of type {R,r,r,…,r} and {r,R,R,…,R},
respectively, the critical value of c is given by the real solution of
12c2c
22…2c
n21=0. This value decreases with n and approach-
es 0.5 when n tends to infinite (practically, for n.10). Since
preference for one schedule or the other can be obtained in the
standard model by adjusting the value of c, there is no new
qualitative behavior emerging from the context-sensitive model in
this task. We conclude that in simple choice tasks and in choice-
schedule tasks the context-sensitive model predicts the same
qualitative behavior as the standard TD model.
General model for Markov Decision Processes
(MDPs). Reinforcement schedules and choice tasks are
examples of MDPs. Formally, a MDP is a collection of states,
each with an associated cost or reward, and a set of transition
probabilities that govern the transitions between those states. We
shall indicate with Pij the probability to move to state j from state i
(Figure 7A). The numbers Pij must satisfy a number of properties,
among which: (a) the transition from i to j must depend on current
state i but not on any state previously visited (the Markov
property), and (b) starting from i, a transition to some other state
must occur, i.e., gj Pij=1 (see, e.g., [6] for an introductory
exposition of the theory of MDPs). A MDP is a very general
framework and is widely used as an abstract setting for RL
problems [6], where the transition probability rule Pij is called a
‘‘policy.’’ However, this framework does not consider the effort
due to an instrumental action required to leave the current state,
which could induce some motivational reluctance to the subject, as
shown in the reward schedule. This is also true in choice tasks,
where even in the case of excellent performance, the percentage of
correct trials is typically less than 100%. In defining a policy for
the reward schedule (Equation 1) we have, in effect, introduced an
example of what we shall call ‘‘instrumental MDP,’’ i.e., a MDP
where each transition is conditioned on an instrumental action
being performed correctly, otherwise an error results and no
transition is possible, represented by a self-link to the current state
in Figure 7A. We show in this section that a general policy can be
introduced for an instrumental MDP, of which the policy
Equation 1 for the reward schedule task, and the softmax
function Equation 11 used in the choice tasks of Figures 5 and 6
are special cases.
In the more general case of an instrumental MDP, we shall
define the policy, i.e. the probability of making a transition from i
to j, as the product of the probability P(m|i) of leaving the current
state i (by performing correctly), times the probability P(iRj|m)o f
transitioning to state j, given that the agent is motivated to do so:
Pij~Pi ?jm j ðÞ :Pmi j ðÞ ð 12Þ
(Figure 7A). In the reward schedule, P(iRj|m) equals 1 if j is the
next state in the schedule, otherwise it equals zero, hence the
policy reduces to Pij=P(m|i) (Figure 7B). In a choice task, the full
policy Equation 12 should be used, which takes in account also the
fraction of incorrectly performed trials. However, choice behavior
is typically analyzed on correct trials only (as we have done in the
previous section), since these are the trials where an actual choice
occurs. On the subset of correct trials, P(m|i) is determined to be 1,
and the policy reduces to Pij(iRj|m) (Figure 7C). This explains our
use of different policies for reinforcement schedules and choice
tasks, respectively.
Regarding the specific choice of policies we have adopted, note
that P(iRj|m) need not be a softmax function e
bVj P
je
bVj as in Figures 5
and 6, but could be any other suitable policy (e.g., a greedy or an
e-greedy policy, see [6] for details). As for P(m|i), the reward
schedule data presented in this manuscript imply that P(m|i)
cannot be taken to be the choice type, i.e., of the same type as
P(iRj|m), regardless of the actual functional form used for it. This
point can be illustrated with the following simple argument. Since
error trials must be repeated, one might be tempted to frame the
motivational process of performing the trial as a choice between
proceeding to the next state in the schedule, say j, or remaining in
the current state i: ebVj ebVizebVj    {1. However, in the task with
random cues this policy would give a 50% error rate, which is
never observed. The motivation to perform at all, therefore,
cannot be framed as a decision process of the choice type. In
mathematical terms, P(m|i) can only depend on the current state
and be an increasing function of its value. A softmax function,
Pmi j ðÞ ~ebVi xzebVi    {1, where the parameter x.0 may be
required for proper normalization, is a natural choice [6,29]. We
have provided additional evidence for this choice because of its
ability to explain detailed aspects of the behavior (Figure 4). The
actual value of x is immaterial and could be tuned to maximize the
agreement with the data in each dataset. However, we found one
Figure 7. Model for the general Markov Decision Process
(MDP). (A) Policy for the general MDP. In the fragment of MDP shown,
the agent is in state i and must decide (1) whether to leave the state
(with probability P(m|i)), and (2) in which state to go in case of a positive
decision (weighting each choice with probability P(iRj|m)). Decision 1
depends on the motivational value of current state; decision 2 depends
on the relative values of the possible arrival states, or choices. Both the
motivational and the choice values are learned with the TD method of
the main text. If the agent is not motivated to perform the trial, it will
find itself in the same state one time step later (curved arrow). If the
agent is sufficiently motivated to perform the trial correctly, it proceeds
to make a choice. In the figure, this situation is represented by the
curved shaded region from which the arrows to the possible choices
reach out. In the general case, the transition probability Pij is the
product of the probabilities P(m|i) and P(iRj|m). (B) Policy in the reward
schedule task. In this case, P(iRj|m) because there is no choice and j can
only be the next schedule state (in this example, i=1/2, j=2/2). Thus,
Pij=P(m|i). (C) Policy in the choice task when considering only correct
trials. In this case, P(m|i) is determined to be 1 and thus Pij=(iRj|m).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000131.g007
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this reduces the number of degrees of freedom and thus offers the
most parsimonious account of the data. The same principle would
demand b to be the same in both Equation 1 and in
Pi ?jm j ðÞ ~ e
bVj P
je
bVj, although it need not be.
Regarding the general policy Equation 12, note that gj Pij#1,
since P(m|i)#1: the sum over j now represents the percentage of
correct trials. Also, note that j can also be state i, if the agent is
given the choice of remaining in the current state as a result of
executing the corresponding action correctly. In such a case, the
probability of remaining in state i is formally the product of the
probability of leaving the state times the probability of choosing to
return to it. This possibility is relevant if, for example, error trials
need not be repeated. Thus, remaining in the current state can be
the consequence of a choice (with probability P(iRi|m)?P(m|i)), or
the consequence of an error (with probability P(m ¯|i)), if error trials
must be repeated. These two possibilities need to be kept
conceptually distinct. If, after an error, the agent is positioned in
a different state, the self-link in Figure 7A and B is replaced by a
link to the corresponding state (with transition probability P(m ¯|i)).
In general, P(iRi|m) and P(m|i) depend on the same value Vi, but
in different ways. All values are learned with the same learning
rule, which might be the standard TD method, or its generaliza-
tion introduced here to account for the schedule length effect. If
the latter method is used together with the full policy Equation 12,
a schedule length effect for the error rates will emerge also in the
choice-schedule tasks of Figure 6 (not shown).
Finally, this framework can be generalized to the case of
transitions in continuous time. So far, transitions (including errors)
could only happen at discrete time steps indexed by trial number,
an adequate simplification for the purpose of this study. Formally,
this means that Pij=Pij(t), where t is the trial number. However,
one could define an arbitrary time unit t, much smaller than t,s o
that each trial (or any event of duration longer than t) can unfold in
time, like in the ‘‘serial compound representation’’ implementa-
tions of RL models (see, e.g., [30,31]). Each transition would thus
occur at a variable time, Pij(t)=P(iRj|m)?P(m|i;t), depending on
P(m|i;t). In this scenario, at each time step t the agent ‘‘decides’’ to
make a transition depending on P(m|i;t), and when it does, the
final state of the transition is regulated by P(iRj|m), which may
also depend on time, if the nature of the decision problem requires
it. An error trial could be defined accordingly. For example, in the
reward schedule, where reaction times are of the order of 300–
600 ms, t could be chosen to be, e.g., 20 ms and the requirement
of performing a correct trial would translate into a transition
occurring between tGO+10t and tGO+50t, where tGO marks the
time onset of the GO signal. A lack of transition within this
window is counted as an error: the agent is held in a ‘‘null’’ state
for the duration of the inter-trial interval, during which no
transitions are allowed, and then repositioned into the previous
state at the beginning of the next trial. This implementation also
allows the introduction of reaction time as the time elapsed since
tGO and when a transition occurs. It is predicted that the larger the
motivational value, the faster the reaction time, and the smaller
the number of errors, as observed in the experiments [17,22–25].
Discussion
In reward schedule tasks, monkeys make substantially more
errors in validly cued unrewarded trials than in rewarded trials.
The number of errors decreases with reward proximity. Also, the
error rates are typically smaller in trials equally distant from
reward, but belonging to longer schedules (schedule length effect;
Figure 2). Both of these features disappear and monkeys make
fewer errors in the absence of valid cues.
The monkeys do not maximize the amount of reward over the
smallest number of trials, violating a principle requiring maximi-
zation of reward over time, and also violate the principle of
invariance in trials equally far from reward, especially penultimate
trials (Figure 2). This behavioral pattern occurs in most monkeys,
thus it is robust and reliable. It only occurs after the meanings of
the cues are learned, and persists over long periods (months or
years despite constant practice in the task). Therefore, it should not
be construed as maladaptive simply because it violates the
principles of reward-maximization and invariance. Since the
monkeys were allowed to work until they stopped by themselves, it
can be inferred that they would get a sufficient amount of liquid
reward, and were simply not interested in maximizing the amount
over time.
We have argued that the monkeys’ behavior is a direct
consequence of learning the motivational values attached to each
trial by using the cues. Either randomizing the cues or damaging
the rhinal cortex prevents the formation of this typical error rates
pattern [26,32], and damaging orbitofrontal cortex blunts it [33].
In the model introduced here, the motivational values of the
schedule states arise through trial-and-error learning and lead to
suboptimal behavior. In its basic form, i.e., with s=0, this model
can be described as TD-learning for solving the value prediction
problem [6,27]. The standard RL approach is usually concerned
with the development of behavioral strategies that adapt towards
optimality, and less often with the simpler value prediction
problem, i.e., the problem of learning to predict the long term
return obtainable starting from each behavioral state and following
a given policy. Our interpretation of the RL method used in this
work follows this thread, because the policy (the performance
function Equation 1) is fixed and is not modified by the learning
algorithm (of course its arguments, the values, are). This has been
called ‘‘learning with an indirect actor’’ by Dayan and Abbott
[34]. The particular policy used for the reward schedule departs
from previous accounts because it depends on the value of the
current state only. This is one of two core departures of our model
from existing ones (e.g., [35,36]). The second is the modification of
the learning rule so as to capture the schedule length effect.
Properties and Predictions of the Model in the Reward
Schedule Task
In our model, a single algorithm explains the differential
behavior with valid and random cues. Assuming that the average
value of the schedule states is a measure of overall motivation, the
model predicts that the overall motivation is similar in the valid
and random cue conditions. The difference in performance in the
two paradigms is a consequence of the non-linear (sigmoidal)
shape of the performance function Equation 1 (cf. Figure 4C). The
finding that the same overall level of motivation leads to different
patterns of error rates with valid and random cues is not built into
the model but is an emergent property of the learning process.
The context-sensitive model also predicts that, although the
behavior appears to be the same in all terminal trials, terminal trials
mayacquire differentvalues(see,e.g.,Equation9).Thisdifferenceis
not reflected in the behavior since the latter depends on both the
values (which might be different) and the performance function
(Equation 1), which tends to remove value differences in the high
value region(Figure 4C).In this region the performance function(or
its complement) is almost flat and slight differences in value will be
unlikely to produce observable differences in error rate.
The context-sensitive behavior is also an emergent property of
the model. The model does not change the definition of the
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cues come to ‘‘label’’ the schedule states via predictive learning.
The basic model translates these labels into a pattern of
motivational values and error rates which only depend on reward
proximity, and thus are the same in penultimate trials. This
symmetry is broken in the context-sensitive model as a
consequence of generalizing the temporal difference so as to look
backwards as well as forward, and not through a redefinition of the
schedule states.
It might seem at first that the model does not take into account
the cost of performing a trial, i.e., the cost of releasing the bar at
the GO signal. In fact, this cost could be interpreted as the origin
of the residual, non-zero error rate given by the performance
function (Equation 1) when the values are maximal (approximate-
ly, the error rate in validly-cued rewarded trials). It is also possible
to implement this cost so as to affect the values of each state,
V(S)RV(S)2c, where c stands for cost. However, since the cost of
the action is the same for all trials, it could not account for the
differential error rates in different schedule states.
Inadequacy and Generalization of Standard TD Learning
Our analysis unveils the inadequacy of standard TD learning
for the reward schedule task. The general statement can be proved
that it is not possible to capture the schedule length effect with RL
methods inspired to TD learning, including TD(l) [27], if these
only take into account the values of trials remaining in the current
schedule (cfr. Equation 4; see Materials and Methods for details).
Thus, for a method based on temporal differences to capture the
schedule length effect, its learning prescription must have access
either to the value of a past trial in the current schedule, as
proposed in this manuscript, or to the value of a trial belonging to
a different schedule, a method that is not clear how to generalize
beyond the reward schedule task.
The predictions of the context-sensitive model are the same as
standard TD learning in a wide class of other tasks involving choice,
where the values of states at decision nodes apply equally to
whatever outcome of the decision. In simple choice tasks (cf.
Figure. 5), both models predict a preference for more probable
rewards, either always—under a greedy policy—or with occasional,
temporary reversals of preference when the policy allows explor-
atory behavior—like the softmax function Equation 11. In the
choice-schedule task of Figure 6A, the context-sensitive model
predicts the same preference as the standard model. With schedules
comprising more than two trials, choice preference of one model
can be mapped into the choice preference of the other by
readjusting the value of the discount rate c appropriately. Thus
the context-sensitive model, although heuristic in its derivation,
appears to be a generalization of standard TD learning: it predicts
the same behavior in tasks where human and animal subjects
tprefer the choice leading to more probable or larger rewards; but it
also predicts the violation of the principle of invariance occurring in
the reward schedule task, not captured by the standard model; and
it predicts the ‘‘procrastination-like’’ behavior of monkeys in the
same task. The latter is to be generally expected in tasks requiring a
step-wise approach to reward, where the willingness to act in each
singletrialexertsapowerfulinfluenceonthebehavior.More workis
required to characterize fully the mathematical properties of the
model, and explore its possible derivation from well-defined
principles as is customary in the fields of Machine Learning and
RL, which is beyond the scope of this work.
Extension to General Markov Decision Processes
The reward schedule and choice tasks represent two particular
cases of general MDPs where the problem of making a decision
can be factorized into two sub-problems, the motivation to
perform at all, and the selection of one among alternative choices
given the motivation to act. We have used the strategy of dividing
this general problem into two parts: we have analyzed the
behavior as driven by motivational value using the reward
schedule task, and the behavior as driven by choice preference
using choice tasks. In both cases, we have compared the standard
and the novel TD model using the same policy for both. These two
components are simply multiplied in general MDPs, where by
definition both the motivation to act and choice selection can
occur.
Our results indicate that only in the choice selection problem
does the actor-critic architecture of RL [6,37] potentially have a
significant role. In the actor-critic architecture, the RL problem is
solved by two related ‘‘structures,’’ one responsible for performing
the action (the actor), the other responsible for criticizing those
actions based on evaluative feedback (the critic). Actor-critic
architectures usually lead to policies that maximize the long-term
return, and thus they seem to have only a small role in the reward
schedule task. If an underlying actor-critic is present, its
effectiveness in producing optimal control might be blunted by
an opposing force deriving from the purely motivational nature of
the problem encountered in this task, i.e., whether or not to
comply with its demands. Indeed, we have shown that it is
sufficient for the critic to assess the value of the current trial and
use it to direct the level of engagement in the task, without the
need for a more specialized actor structure as would be required
for action selection [38]. Instead, the process of valuation of
several alternatives, potentially leading to different courses of
actions and rewards as it typically occurs in general decision
problems, could benefit more from an actor-critic organization of
the behavior.
Related Work
The extension of RL to capture the fundamental role of
motivation in reinforcement schedules is currently a major
challenge for the field, and other authors have also considered
how to include motivation in RL [14,15]. These authors focused
on incorporating overall drive (e.g., such as degree of hunger or
thirst) so as to describe how habitual responses can be modified by
the current motivational level, which is, in turn, assumed to
influence generalized drive through sensitivity to average reward
levels [39]. In the reward schedule, however, we focused on how
motivation orients behavior in a trial-specific, not generalized,
manner. In such a case, an alternative solution to ascribing errors
to a decreased level of motivation is Pavlovian-instrumental
competition, which has been used to explain suboptimal behavior
[16]. Applied to the reward schedule task, this solution would posit
that error trials would result from the competition between the
negative valence of the valid cue associated to an unrewarded trial
(acquired through a Pavlovian-like mechanism), and the incentive
to perform the same trial correctly to reach the end of the schedule
and obtain reward. This interpretation is supported somewhat by
the fact that the visual cues have no instrumental role in the
reward schedule (they are neither triggers nor instructors of correct
behavioral actions). The schedule length effect, however, escapes
explanations in terms of Pavlovian-instrumental competition and
would still have to be taken into account. Instead, the single
motivational mechanism put forward in this work accounts for all
the aspects of the behavior; has a natural interpretation in terms of
learned motivation to act, however originated; and can be
extended to general MDPs.
A dependence on the value of the preceding state implemented
in our learning rule suggests an explanation of the schedule length
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predictors of the availability of resources, monkeys’ decisions about
where to forage depend on past information like the history of
preceding reinforcements [40], or stored information about recent
trends in weather [41]. Lau and Glimcher [28] have found that
past choices, in addition to past reinforcements, must be taken into
account to predict the trial-by-trial behavior of rhesus monkeys
engaged in a choice task resulting in matching behavior. However,
contrary to the statistical description of Lau and Glimcher [28],
past information in our model bears an effect on the learning rule,
not directly on the action selection process, and it does so through
the value of the previous state, as opposed to past reinforcements
or past choice history. Taken together, these findings point to
some form of sensitivity to preceding actions and visited states (or
their values) in primates’ foraging behavior, and the schedule
length effect might be a side effect of such a mechanism, perhaps
also present in other forms of reinforcement learning.
Relation to Neural Data
Current theories of reinforcement learning posit that dopami-
nergic neurons code for a prediction error signal analogous to d in
our model and in TD learning in general [30]. Data from
dopaminergic neurons of monkeys performing a reward schedule
task, however, are not in sufficient accord with the predictions of
such theories [24]. For example, one prediction is that d, and
therefore dopamine neurons, after sufficient training should cease
to respond to predicted reward, and this was not observed. Recent
developments [42,43] rule out that this could be the consequence
of the small temporal jitter around reward delivery. Despite the
incongruence with the assumed role of dopamine neurons as
signaling some form of prediction error, there is clear evidence of
the involvement of dopamine in learning. In the reward schedule,
the importance of dopamine D2 receptors for learning the
meaning of new valid cues has been demonstrated in perirhinal
cortex [26], and Ravel and Richmond [24] have argued that
salient events may drive dopaminergic neurons, whose activity
may be required for enhancing the connection of the stimulus with
its prediction in perirhinal cortex.
The contextual impact of the organization of the task in
schedules has been found in the event-related responses of neurons
in all neural structures investigated thus far in the reward schedule
task, except perhaps for neurons of the area TE [22]. The brain
area where the neural modulation with schedule state is most
apparent is the anterior cingulate cortex [44]. One third of the
neurons recorded in this area keep track of the progress through
the schedule in the Valid Cue condition, and could reflect the
(motivational) value of the schedule states and their being linked to
one another in a chain of states culminating in the rewarded trial.
Another candidate structure for the representation of the schedule
states is the perirhinal cortex, whose neurons become selective for
the meaning of the visual cues, as opposed to, e.g., TE neurons’
responses that are locked to their physical identity [22].
In some brain regions, neuronal responses are different in trials
of different schedules that might be regarded as homologous,
particularly last trials of different schedules. Dopamine neurons
[24], perirhinal neurons [22] and ventral striatum neurons [23]
respond differently to valid cues in last trials (predicting the same
reward, but in different schedules). This is reminiscent of the
phenomenon that the context-sensitive model assigns different
values to terminal trials belonging to different schedules.
Neurons of the basolateral complex of the amygdala often have
differential post-cue activity in first trials [25]. In these neurons
another, different effect related to the organization in schedules
has also been observed: these neurons increase their activity in the
pre-cue period before the beginning of each schedule. No pre-cue
activity was observed in the Random Cue condition, supporting
the hypothesis that pre-cue activity is related to the contextual
imprint of the task’s organization in schedules [25]. This activity
could be related to a context-sensitive representation of the values
of the states, either in the amygdala itself, or in areas connected to
the amygdala like perirhinal cortex [22], anterior cingulate cortex
[44] and ventral striatum [23], where the schedule state meaning
of valid cues is strongly represented. The possibility of a more
specific role of the amygdala for the emergence of the schedule
length effect will be considered later when discussing the analogous
phenomenon of ‘‘framing’’ in humans.
Finally, there is evidence for the role of the primate striatum in
learned action selection, with some authors [45] proposing for its
ventral part coding for the values of states (reminiscent of the critic
in actor-critic RL methods), and its dorsal part coding for the
values of actions and for action selection (reminiscent of the actor
[11,13,45]; but see [38]). In the reward schedule, the largest
population of ventral striatum neurons which are responsive
around the time of bar release, do so in rewarded trials, with the
second larger population being responsive in all trials [23].
Comparison of latency and periods of peak activity between these
neurons and neurons of the orbitofrontal cortex suggest that the
latter are better positioned for representing the reward contingen-
cy and thus for guiding action, whereas the former are more
related to executing the action [46]. This role is usually ascribed to
more dorsal regions of the striatum, but the involvement of the
ventral striatum is conceivable in the reward schedule, given the
simple action selection required (it amounts to the timely execution
of the bar release in all contingencies), and it is compatible with
our model, where the probability of a correct bar release is based
solely on the value of the current state and not on action values.
Interpretation of the Schedule Length Effect: Framing
and Sunk Cost
In the context-sensitive model, the mechanism responsible for
the schedule length effect leads to the violation of invariance. The
violation of this principle was invoked by Tversky and Kahneman
in their description of ‘‘framing’’ [18,19]. Framing describes the
process whereby the choice made is influenced by the manner or
context in which the choice is presented. Thaler [47] and Tversky
and Kahneman [18] showed that humans often act as if they kept
separate accounts for gains and losses, rather than estimate the
total value. A consequence of keeping separate accounts is that the
manner in which a problem is cast, in terms of gains, of losses, or
of total value influences choices. For example, people purchasing
two items, costing respectively $15 and $125, are more willing to
put an effort (for example by driving to another store) to save $5
when this is presented as a discount on the $15 item, than when
presented as a discount on the $125 item, even though the total
saving is the same [18,47,48]. Similarly, monkeys are willing to put
more effort in a trial if the total effort to get there had been larger,
even though this does not affect the upcoming reward. A ‘‘minimal
account’’ would consider only the proximity to reward, whereas
the behavior of the monkeys shows that a combination of minimal
(reward proximity) and topical (workload) accounts affects their
motivation when facing a reward schedule. From this point of
view, reward proximity could be seen as a property defining the
state (in accord with Equation 7), much like the $5 discount defines
the saving in the example above, independently of the item to
which it is nominally attached. In both cases, it is the comparison
with some truly contextual attribute that assigns a different
motivational value to the same action. Thus, especially on
penultimate trials, the length of the schedule seems to exert a
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framing. A more direct, preliminary example of framing in
monkeys has been reported recently [49] using a task similar to
one previously used with starlings [50].
The schedule length effect is also reminiscent of the so-called
‘‘sunk cost’’ effect [20,21,51,52], ‘‘a maladaptive behavior that is
manifested in a greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an
investment in money, effort or time has been made’’ [21]. The
sunk cost phenomenon comes in different varieties and with
different interpretations (to the point of having different names,
like ‘‘Concorde effect,’’ ‘‘cognitive dissonance,’’ ‘‘work ethics,’’ see
[20] for a review), some of which come close to framing. In one
interpretation, sunk cost derives from the violation of the principle
that ‘‘a prior investment should not influence one’s consideration
of current options; only the incremental costs and benefits of the
current options should influence one’s decision’’ [20]. The
similarity with the schedule length effect and with the previous
discussion about its interpretation in terms of framing seems
obvious. A relevant example is Experiment 2 of Arkes and Blumer
[21]. In this experiment, three groups of patrons were sold season
tickets for the Ohio University Theater at three different prices,
and those who purchased tickets at either of the discounted prices
attended fewer plays during the season. In this case, the money
spent at the beginning of the season influenced the patrons’ choice
to attend the plays.
It could be argued that, in the reward schedule task, the cost of
performing trials is not strictly a ‘‘sunk’’ (wasted) cost, as it would
be if the monkeys had to start the schedule anew after each error
trial. However, this would only be a minor difference with other
instantiations of sunk cost effects; and it could similarly be argued
that the money spent in Experiment 2 of Arkes and Blumer [21] is
not a wasted cost, since it is necessary to attend the plays.
Various explanations of sunk cost and framing have been
proposed. Arkes and Ayton [20] explain the sunk cost fallacy as an
overgeneralization of the ‘‘don’t waste’’ rule, since based on their
review of the literature, the effect is not unambiguously present in
lower animals, and is not found in children [20]. Even if the
schedule length effect can legitimately be interpreted in terms of
sunk cost or framing, we think that this is unlikely to be the correct
explanation. A better explanation may be linked to emotional
factors. A functional imaging study [53] points to an important
emotional component in the susceptibility to frames in humans.
This study found the susceptibility to framing linked to amygdala
activations, with the ability to resist the frame linked to activation
of the orbital and medial frontal cortex. Similarly, we believe that
there is a strong emotional component responsible for the
monkey’s reaction to unrewarded cues (leading to larger error
rates), and possibly for the schedule length effect. Thus, a
connection between this emotional component and parameter s,
which quantifies the schedule length effect in our model, could be
speculated on the basis that a larger s implies a larger schedule
length effect, in the same way as a larger emotional component
would imply a stronger susceptibility to framing [53]. We do not
reject this idea as a possibility, but our data are not sufficient
evidence for it.
Our model does make a clear prediction in one case where
framing has been found, i.e., in the increase in preference due to
training with a larger cost [51], a case of state-dependent learned
valuation. In this experiment, starlings preferred to choose stimuli
which had previously associated with a larger effort (16 1-m flights
vs. four 1-m flights) to obtain an otherwise identical reward. Since
this paradigm pitted two reinforcement schedules of different
length against each other, there are obvious similarities with our
reward schedule task. Indeed, it would be possible to run a similar
test in monkeys by associating different cues to terminal trials in
different schedules (e.g., cue H for the longer schedule and cue L
for the shorter), and then test the monkeys’ preference in a choice
task where there is no cost (or equal cost) to obtain the same
reward from two sources, one cued with H, the other with L.
Would the monkey prefer the cue associated during training with
the longer schedule, as found in starlings [51]? Our model predicts
exactly this. Because of the accumulation of previous values, the
values of terminal trials are larger in longer schedules in the model
with s.0. Assuming that in the choice task preference depends on
the same learned values, the source of reward cued by H
(previously associated with the longer schedule) would be
preferred. This also means that our model implies state-dependent
learned valuation when the state of the animal is defined by the
cumulative effort expended to obtain the reward.
We stress, however, that our learning model is not meant to be a
general model of the effects that frames, or sunk costs, have on
humans and animals. For example, Pompilio et al [52] offer
additional evidence of state-dependent valuation in an inverte-
brate (the grasshopper), but in their case the state of the animals at
the time of learning is defined by their nutritional state (e.g., more
or less hungry) as opposed to their expended cost. They found that
the grasshoppers, in a later choice task with equal cost, prefer the
food experienced when in a lower nutritional state during learning.
We do not see a connection between this finding and the schedule
length effect, or the role of the parameter s. This should not be
surprising. As Pompilio et al. [52] point out, there may be more
than a single mechanism responsible for state-dependent valua-
tion, depending on the animal and, in the same animal, depending
on the paradigm used for training.
Conclusions
In the heuristic modification of TD learning introduced in this
work, the schedule length effect emerges spontaneously from the
sensitivity to the immediately preceding trial, leading to the
violation of the invariance principle. Since this principle is violated
in instances of framing and sunk cost effects, we have interpreted
the monkeys’ behavior using the framing and sunk cost analogies,
even though monkeys might not be susceptible to framing or sunk
cost the way humans are. We are not aware of alternative RL
models predicting the violation of the principle of invariance.
Materials and Methods
Subjects and Behavioral Paradigm
In this work we collate the behavioral data from earlier studies
on monkeys (Macaca mulatta) tested in the reward schedule task
[22–26,32,44]. In all of these studies, randomly interleaved
schedules of one, two or three trials must be completed to obtain
a reward. In n=3 monkeys, schedules with 4 trials were also used.
A trial begins when the monkey touches a bar (Figure 1A), causing
the appearance of a visual cue. Four hundred milliseconds later a
red dot (WAIT signal) appears in the center of the cue. After a
random interval of 500–1500 ms the dot turns green (GO signal).
The monkey is required to release the touch-bar between 200 and
800 ms after the green dot appeared, in which case the dot turns
blue (OK signal), and a drop of liquid reward is delivered 250 to
350 ms later. If the monkey releases the bar outside the 200–
800 ms interval after the GO signal, an error is registered, and no
reward is delivered. To start, monkeys are trained on this simple
color discrimination task, with or without the presence of a cue,
and are rewarded for every correct trial. When performance
reaches criterion (at least 75% correct), reward schedules start.
Each reward schedule is a sequence of 1, or 2, or 3, …, or Ns trials,
Violation of Invariance in Reinforcement Schedules
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Figure 1B for a 2-trial schedule). All schedules are selected with
equal probability, and within a schedule error trials must be
repeated until performed correctly. Only correct terminal trials are
rewarded. After a correct terminal trial, a new schedule is selected
pseudo-randomly. Each schedule state is labeled by the pair {t,s},
where t=1,2,…,s stands for trial and s=1,2,…,Ns stands for
schedule. Terminal trials have t=s. Trials of different schedules
representing the same schedule fraction (e.g., 1/2 and 2/4) are
considered different schedule states, even though they might have
been associated to the same visual cue (Valid Cue condition, see
below). Different cue sets have been used in different studies
[17,22–26,32,44,54], producing similar behavioral results. For the
data shown in Figure 2, collected by Sugase-Miyamoto and
Richmond [25] (panel A) and Shidara and Richmond [44] (panel
B), horizontal bars with different brightness were used as cues, and
the cues were brighter as the schedule progressed. Other cue sets
have also been used. Some, still based on cue brightness, had the
opposite relationship between brightness and proximity to reward,
e.g., cues were darker towards the end of the schedule, as, e.g., in
Figure 1 [22,24,32,54], to ensure that the behavior of the monkeys
was not biased by the direction of brightness. Other cue sets were
based on bar length [26,32]; still others consisted of unique stimuli
like, e.g., Walsh patterns [26], to establish that the behavior was
not a consequence of having a sensory attribute (like length or
brightness) increasing or decreasing with proximity to reward. The
typical behavioral patterns that are the main focus of this work
were similar across individual experiments and cue sets.
In the paradigm with random cues, the same visual stimuli are
present, but each stimulus is selected pseudo-randomly with equal
probability in each trial (Random Cue condition). In such a case,
there is no relationship between cues and schedule states, although
the schedules are still in effect.
The monkeys were not taught the ‘‘rules’’ of the reward
schedule task but were simply exposed to it. The behavior reported
in Figure 2 emerges spontaneously, typically within a week of the
first exposure, depending on the monkey (in some cases, it emerges
on the very first day), and it generalizes rapidly (in less than 3 days)
to different cue sets.
Data Analysis and Statistics
For each monkey, the error rates were calculated as the ratio of
the total number of incorrect trials (in all sessions) to the total
number of trials for each schedule state. Differences in error rates
across schedule states were tested with a x
2 test of the contingency
table obtained from the numbers of correct and incorrect trials
(confidence was taken at the 5% level). Pair-wise comparisons of the
error rates in different schedule states were tested with the
Marascuilo procedure after a significant x
2 test [55]. If the x
2 test
is significant at the a level, the Marascuilo procedure [55,56]
provides a confidence interval of 100(12a)% for each pair-wise
difference of error rates |pi2pj|, where pi=ei/ni is the error rate in
schedule state i,a n dei, ni are, respectively, the number of error trials
and total trials in schedule state i. The Marasquilo confidence













2 with N21 degreesof
freedom at a level of significance (the point of the distribution which
leaves an area of a in the upper tail of the distribution). N is the
numberofdifferentschedule states.Schedulestateswith |pi2pj|.p ˆij
are significantly different at the a level.
A sign test [57] was run on the number (n+) of monkeys showing
better performance in penultimate trials belonging to longer
schedules, as compared to the number (n2) of monkeys where
either the inverted pattern, or no difference, was observed. The
‘‘exact’’ binomial probability for n+ successes in n++n2 trials was
used.
Reaction times were defined as the time elapsed since the
appearance of the GO signal and the bar release, and, as reported
previously, were generally shorter in trials more proximal to
reward [17,22–25]. Reaction times had a similar relationship to
schedule states as did error rates. Since they provide no new
qualitative interpretation, they were not analyzed further.
Model Fitting
Foreachmonkey,thetheoreticalerrorrates(pth)werefittedtothe
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niz1 zDpi  is approximately a 68% confidence interval around
pex,i based on Wilson’s ‘‘score’’ equation [59,60], and (Li,+2Li,2)/
2=Dpi. The theoretical error rates were given by Equations 2, 9,
and 10. The minimization of x
2 was accomplished with a full
factorial search of the best-fit values for parameters b, c,a n ds of
Equations 2, 9, and 10.
Solution of the Model
The formula Equation 6 of the main text for the equilibrium
values of the basic model is exact only in the absence of errors,
otherwise the values are smaller and are given by the self-
consistent, recursion formula:
VS ðÞ ~
PcV S ðÞ j
1{c 1{PcV S ðÞ j
  
()
cVS 0 ðÞ ð 13Þ
Here, S9 is the next state in the schedule, Pc|V(S);P(c|V(S)) is the
probability of correct performance in (current) state S, conditioned
on the value of that state, V(S). V(S) appears also on the left hand
side, and for this reason the formula defines V(S) only implicitly. If
S is a terminal trial, cV(S9) must be replaced by r in Equation 13.
By iteration, Equation 13 gives
Vts~ PtsPtz1,s...Pss ðÞ c s{t ðÞ r ð14Þ
where Pts:
PcV t,s fg ðÞ j
1{c 1{PcV t,s fg ðÞ j ðÞ to simplify the notation. This set of
equations must be solved self-consistently for Vts as the Pts depend
on Vts. Under the optimal policy of not making any errors, i.e.,
with each Pc|V;1 independently of V instead of Equation 1,
Equation 14 becomes the explicit solution given by Equation 6
reported in the main text.
Equation 13 can be derived as follows: at equilibrium, V(S) is the
average of the value obtained after an error (Ve, occurring with
probability Pe|V;12Pc|V) and the value obtained after a correct
trial (Vc, probability Pc|V), conditioned on current average value
being V, i.e.
V~Vc V ðÞ PcV j zVe V ðÞ 1{PcV j
  
ð15Þ
with Vc(V)=V+a(cV92V) and Ve=V+a(cV2V). The last two
equations are simply the update equation for V after a correct
and an incorrect trial respectively; V9;V(S9) is the value of the next
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terminal trials). Solving Equation 15 for V gives Equation 13.
The same procedure, though more involved algebraically, gives








where Prs is defined as for the basic model. This system of
equations must be solved self-consistently for the values Vrs. In the
absence of errors, each Prs=1 and Equations 9 of the main text
follow. We have checked with simulations that the approximate
solution given by Equations 9 gives a good approximation to the
correct values on our dataset of monkeys’ data. For this reason,
Equations 2 and 9 were used to estimate the theoretical values
when fitting the theoretical error rates to the experimental error
rates.
In the Random Cue condition, the cues define the states of the
model. The model learns the values of the cues using the same
algorithm specified by Equations 1, 3, and 8, with St;cuet. The
next cue is selected at random with equal probability for all cues if
the trial is performed correctly, otherwise the current cue remains
as the next. We set d=rt+sV(cuet21)2V(cuet) in terminal trials, in
keeping with the rule adopted with valid cues. The average value
of random cues can be obtained by averaging the update equation





fidi V ðÞ ð 16Þ
i.e., gi fidi(V)=0, where V is the sought average value, fi is the
average frequency with which trial i occurs, and di is the temporal
difference in trial i. In the basic model, it is sufficient to distinguish
three trial types: correct terminal trials, incorrect terminal trials,
and non terminal trials. The frequency (f) of correct terminal trials
is N+Pc|V, where N+ is the average fraction of rewarded trials, equal
to the number of schedules divided by the number of schedule
states. In correct terminal trials the temporal difference is d=r2V.
Incorrect terminal trials occur with frequency N+(12Pc|V) and
have d=2V; non-terminal trials occur with frequency 12N+ and
generate a temporal difference d=(c21)V, whether the trial is






Equation 17 defines V only implicitly and must be solved self-
consistently to give the exact value of V. For the small error rates
usually encountered with random cues, Equation 17 is well
approximated by its version in the absence of errors (Pc|V=1 for
any V), i.e. V~
Nzr
1{c 1{Nz ðÞ . Note how V increases with c and is
constrained between the average collected reward N+r (for c=0)
and r (for c=1). Setting c=0 (value at which V is minimal) is the
same as assuming that the next cue is always unknown and its
value is zero (cfr. Equation 4). This implies that having some
expectation about the next state, even a random expectation as for
the random cues, increases the values and hence the motivation to
perform correctly.
The context-sensitive model can be solved in a similar way, with
in addition non-first trials to be taken into account. The final result
is V~
PcV j Nzr
1{ czs ðÞ 1{Nz ðÞ , from which Equation 10 of the main text
follows under the approximation of small error rates, i.e., Pc|V<1.
Similar results are obtained in the case of post-reward expectation,
where the value of the next state after a rewarded trial is not set to
zero, as shown in a later subsection.
Since it is required that V.0, this result requires
(c+s)(12N+),1, or (c+s),(Ns+1)(Ns21)
21. This inequality is never
violated in the basic model (where s=0), but it might be, and must
be imposed, in the context-sensitive model, especially for long
maximal schedule lengths. Similar restrictions coming from the
values of valid cues also apply (e.g., s,1/2c from Equation 9).
Insufficiency of Forward-Type Methods of Temporal
Difference Learning (Including TD(l))
Here we show that it is not possible to obtain values dependent
on schedule length (like in the context-sensitive model) by using a
standard TD learning rule, which considers only future trials




aiVS tzi ðÞ {VS t ðÞ , where the coefficients
{ai}i=1,2,…,T may depend on pre-reward number (i.e., the number
of trials remaining before reward), but not on schedule length. t+T
is the time at which the terminal trial is reached: when St is a
terminal trial, the states St+i are not defined and their values are set
to zero. It is more convenient to express the values as a function of
the number, n, of trials remaining before reward (‘‘0’’ being the
terminal trial), conditioned on schedule length being s, V(n|s), as in
Equation 7 of the main text. At equilibrium (dt=0) one has
V(1|s)=a1V(0|s). Since V(0|s)=r does not depend on s, V(1|s) does
not depend on s, which in turn implies that V(2|s)=a1V(1|-
(2|s)=a1V(1|s)+a2V(0|s) does not depend on s, and so on. It
follows by induction that V(n|s) does not depend on s for all pre-
reward numbers n, and for any value of the coefficients an (some of
which may vanish). This result holds also in the case of post-
reward expectation, where the value of the next state after a
rewarded trial is not set to zero and the forward terms in the series
g aiV(St+i) are taken to the (T+1)th term. As shown later, all values
are re-scaled by a constant factor which does not depend on s,
leaving the above argument unchanged.
It follows from this argument that, to obtain the schedule-length
effect, it is necessary either to look backwards at the values of
previous trials in the same schedule (as in the context-sensitive
model of the main text), or to take into account trials belonging to
different schedules [61]. The notable TD(l) rule (see, e.g., [6]),
that has been suggested to be implemented by dopamine neurons
of rats [62], considers only forward trials within the current
schedule, and therefore cannot produce the contextual effect due
to schedule length. In fact, here we show that for the reward
schedule, the equilibrium values in the TD(l) rule are the same as
those obtained with the basic model. In TD(l), all forward trials
within a schedule are considered, weighted by imminence.









t {VS t ðÞ ð 18Þ
where the sum is over all states remaining until the terminal one
(reached after T steps). l is a parameter between zero and one;
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2+…+l
T21 is a normalization factor; and R
i ðÞ
t ~rtz
crtz1z...zci{1rtzi{1zciVS tzi ðÞ is the i-steps-ahead predic-
tion starting from St. (If l=0, Equation 18 reduces to
dt=rt+cV(St+1)2V(St), the basic model of the main text.) The
values are updated in the usual way: Vt+1=adt. In the reward
schedule it is R
i ðÞ
t ~ciVS tzi ðÞ (only the terminal trial is rewarded),




cVS tz1 ðÞ zlc2VS tz2 ðÞ z...zl
T{1cTVS tzT ðÞ
  
{VS t ðÞ ,
ð19Þ
where t+T is the time at which the terminal trial is reached. The
solution to dt=0, with dt given by Equation 19, is the same as for
the basic rule (Equations 3 and 4 of the main text), i.e.,
V(St+i)=c
T2ir,o rV(t,s)=c
s2tr if St;{t,s}, as can be proved, e.g.,
by direct substitution. This was confirmed in simulations of TD(l)-
learning of the reward schedule implemented through the use of
eligibility traces, an alternative approach to TD(l) (see [6] for
details).
Solution of the Model with Post-Reward Expectation
So far, the value of the next state at the end of each schedule
had been to set to zero. In other words, the learning rule following
a rewarded trial is dt=rt+sV(St21)2V(St), which written in this
form applies to all cases, including the case of random cues and the
basic model (where s=0). As said in the main text, this is the
common choice in RL [6]. Here we show that behavior predicted
by the model does not change if we assign a positive value to the
next state (‘‘post-reward expectation’’). The reason is that, in a
terminal trial, the next trial is not known and thus the same value
must be assumed independently of current schedule. The actual
value is immaterial, but for the sake of argument we shall make a
choice. In the Random Cue condition, the current value of any
cue chosen at random will do; in the Valid Cue condition, since
the only available information is that the next state will be one of
the initial trials {1,s}, the average value of all first trials will be




V 1,i ðÞ . It can be
shown that the average value of each state is increased by a
constant factor (12cq)
21, where q is the ratio of the value of the
state post-reward to the value of rewarded trials. For the value





this choice gives cq,1). Similarly, the value of random cues
changes from V~
PcV j Nzr
1{ czs ðÞ 1{Nz ðÞ to V~
PcV j Nzr
1{c{s 1{Nz ðÞ . Thus,
there is no qualitative difference with respect to the case of no
post-reward expectation of the main text. A similar argument also
shows that the qualitative behavior does not change if s.0 in first
trials of each schedule in the context-sensitive model.
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